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We explore various extensions of Challet and Zhang’s Minority Game in an attempt
to gain insight into the dynamics underlying financial markets. First we consider a
heterogeneous population where individual traders employ differing ‘time horizons’ when
making predictions based on historical data. The resulting average winnings per trader
is a highly non-linear function of the population’s composition. Second, we introduce a
threshold confidence level among traders below which they will not trade. This can give
rise to large fluctuations in the ‘volume’ of market participants and the resulting market
‘price’.
1. Introduction
Two obvious practical goals in the study of financial markets are to understand how
arbitrage opportunities might arise and consequently be exploited, and to under-
stand quantitatively the origin of price fluctuations. The Minority Game1,2,3,4,5,6,7
represents a fascinating toy-model of a complex adaptive system in which individual
members (e.g., traders) repeatedly compete to be in a minority. The Minority Game
offers a simple paradigm for the decision dynamics underlying financial markets: if
for example there are more buyers than sellers at a given moment, prices are pushed
up and hence it would be better for a trader to be in the minority group of sellers.
Here we explore two extensions of the Minority Game which seem relevant for
real markets. First we consider the performance of a heterogeneous population of
traders who differ in the ‘time horizon’ employed when making buy/sell decisions
based on past market data. We find that the average winnings per trader is a
highly non-linear function of the population’s composition. Second, we introduce
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a threshold confidence level among traders below which they will not trade. We
find that this feature can give rise to large variations in the ‘volume’ of market
participants and the resulting market ‘price’.
2. Basic Minority Game
The basic Minority Game 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 consists of a repeated game with an odd number
of traders N who must choose independently whether to be in room 0 (e.g. buy)
or room 1 (e.g. sell). The winners are those in the room with fewer traders, i.e.
the sellers win if there is an excess of buyers. The output is a single binary digit,
0 or 1, representing the winning decision for each time step. This output is made
available to all traders, and is the only information they can use to make decisions
in subsequent turns. The memory m is the length of the recent history bit-string
that a trader uses when making its next decision 1,2,3,4,5,6. In the market context,
m can be thought of as a ‘time horizon’ over which a given trader considers the
past history to be relevant when making a prediction as to the direction of the next
market movement.
The traders randomly pick s strategies at the beginning of the game, with rep-
etitions allowed. After each turn, the trader assigns one (virtual) point to each
of his strategies which would have predicted the correct outcome. In addition the
trader gets awarded one (real) point if he is successful. At each turn of the game,
the trader uses the most successful strategy (i.e., most virtual points) from his bag
of s strategies. The strategy-space forms a 2m-dimensional hypercube for memory
m with strategies at the 22
m
vertices1,2. If the size of the strategy space is small
compared to the total number of traders N (i.e., 2 · 2m << Ns) many traders
may hold the highest-scoring strategy at any given turn and hence make the same
decision1,2,3,4. This leads to a large standard deviation in the winning room and
hence a relatively low number of total points awarded 1,2,3,4,5,6. Such crowd-effects
are a strategy-space phenomenon and have been shown4 to quantitatively explain
the fluctuations for the pure population as a function of m and s.
3. Mixed population of traders
Consider a population containing Nm1 traders with memory m1, and Nm2 = N −
Nm1 traders with memorym2. We define the average points per trader per turn,W ,
to be the total number of points awarded in that turn divided by the total number
of traders. For small m, W is substantially less than 0.5 due to the crowd-effects
mentioned above. The maximum possible W would correspond to the number
of winners remaining at (N − 1)/2. Therefore W is always less than or equal to
(N−1)/2N , henceW < 0.5. Note that an external (i.e. non-participating) gambler
using a coin-toss to predict the winning decision, would have a 50% success rate since
he would not suffer from this intrinsic crowding in strategy-space. The history-space
forms an m-dimensional hypercube whose 2m vertices correspond to all possible
recent history bit-strings of length m. For a pure population of traders with the
3same memory m, where 2 · 2m << Ns, there is information left in the history time-
series3: however this information is hidden in bit-strings of length greater than m
and hence is not accessible to these traders. For large m, there is information left in
bit-strings of any length: however the traders have insufficient strategies to further
exploit this information3.
Fig. 1. Numerical results for average winnings per trader per turn W : traders with memory m = 3
possess s1 = 2, 3, · · · , 7 strategies (each data set corresponds to a different s1 value) whereas traders
with memory m = 6 have s2 = 7 strategies for each data set.
Figure 1 shows the numerical results for the average points per trader per turn
W in a mixed population of N = 101 traders, with memory m = 3 or 6. The
number of m = 3 traders N3 is shown on the x-axis, hence the number of m = 6
traders is given by N6 = 101 − N3. The m = 3 traders possess s1 = 2, 3, · · · , 7
strategies (each data set corresponds to a different s1) while the m = 6 traders
possess s2 = 7 strategies. The data were collected in the limit of long times, and
averaged over many runs. We observe from Fig. 1 that the average winnings W
can show a maximum at finite mixing.
Figure 2 shows results for the opposite case where them = 3 traders each possess
s1 = 7 strategies while the m = 6 traders possess s2 = 2, 3, · · · , 7 strategies. Note
that simulations in which traders are fed a random (as opposed to real) history7 do
not reproduce the numerical results of Figs. 1 and 2. This is essentially because the
m = 6 traders in the real-history game have the opportunity to exploit correlations
in the real-history time-series left by the m = 3 traders (see also Refs. [1],[2] and
[8]). In other words, the long-memory (i.e., m = 6) traders can identify and exploit
arbitrage opportunities that are inaccessible to the short-memory (i.e., m = 3)
traders.
Any fluctuation in the number of winners away from (N − 1)/2 = 50 implies
wasteage of total points1,2. Hence W ∼ 0.5− σN , where σ is the standard deviation
of the number of traders making a given decision, say ‘buy’. In order to develop
an analytic theory, we assume that the corresponding σ can be obtained by adding
separately the contributions to the variance from the m = 3 traders and the m = 6
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Fig. 2. Numerical results for average winnings per trader per turn W : traders with memory
m = 3 possess s1 = 7 strategies for each data set whereas traders with memory m = 6 have
s2 = 2, 3, · · · , 7 strategies (each data set corresponds to a different s2 value) .
traders. This amounts to assuming that the system has managed to remove any
internal frustration between traders with different memories, and the two groups of
traders behave independently. Hence σ2 ∼ σ23 + σ
2
6 , where σ3 (σ6) is the variance
due to the m = 3 (6) traders. Following Ref. [4], and defining the concentration of
m = 3 traders as x = N3/N , we obtain σ3 ∼ C3xN and σ6 ∼ C6(1−x)N where C3
and C6 are given by the general expression
Cm =
1
2
[∑
r
([
1−
(r − 1)
2 · 2m
]s
−
[
1−
r
2 · 2m
]s)2] 1
2
. (3.1)
The summation is over weakly correlated groups: each group r comprises a crowd of
like-minded (i.e., correlated) traders who use the same strategy, and a corresponding
anticrowd of opposite-minded traders who use the anticorrelated strategy4. The
short-memory (i.e., m = 3) sub-population of traders tends to lie in the crowded
regime, hence we only need to include r = 1 in the summation to obtain C3.
The long-memory (i.e., m = 6) sub-population of traders will tend to lie in the
crowded regime if the number s2 of strategies they hold is large, but will form
crowd-anticrowd pairs if s2 is small
4. To obtain C6 we sum up the terms from r = 1
to r = 101(1 − x) if 2.2
6
2
≥ 101(1 − x), or to r = 2.2
6
2
if 2.2
6
2
< 101(1 − x). The
analytic expression for the average winnings is given by
W ∼ 0.5− [C23x
2 + C26 (1− x)
2]1/2 . (3.2)
Figures 3 and 4 show the analytic results corresponding to the numerical simu-
lations of Figs. 1 and 2 respectively. As can be seen the agreement is fairly good.
Intriguingly, the theory has a tendency to underestimate the actual winnings sug-
gesting that the actual population is somehow exhibiting an additional degree of
co-operation (correlation). A fuller theory of this mixed system thus requires the
inclusion of higher-order inter-trader correlations.
5Fig. 3. Analytic results corresponding to Figure 1.
Fig. 4. Analytic results corresponding to Figure 2.
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4. Threshold confidence level among traders
In the Minority Game with either a homogeneous or heterogeneous population,
traders must either buy or sell at every time-step. In a real market, however,
traders are likely to wait on the sidelines until they are reasonably confident of
winning at a given time-step. They will observe the market passively, mentally
updating their various strategies, until their confidence overcomes some threshold
value - then they will jump in and trade.
We now attempt to incorporate this general behavior as follows. Taking the
simplest generalization, we assign a threshold confidence level rmin below which
a trader will not trade. A trader’s confidence level at a given time-step is deter-
mined by the success rate r of his best-performing strategy over the last T time-
steps. Hence the number of traders who actively trade Nactive will fluctuate in
time - this feature is reminiscent of the grand canonical ensemble in statistical
mechanics1,2. We will call Nactive(t) the ‘volume’ of active traders at time t. Given
that Nactive(t) = Nbuy(t)+Nsell(t), we can form a simple-minded ‘price’ time-series
P (t) by setting
P (t+ 1) = P (t) + [Nbuy(t)−Nsell(t)]/D (4.3)
where D is a parameter characteristic of a particular market. For simplicity we take
D to be time-independent. Similar linear expressions for the price P (t) have been
discussed recently by other authors9.
A real market is not a zero-sum game - the commission charged by the market
maker and/or general transaction costs imply that the success rate will be less
than 50%, similar to the Minority Game. Hence it is reasonable to expect that
typically rmin ≥ 0.5. Interestingly, the fluctuations in Nactive are much larger at
rmin = 0.5 than for rmin 6= 0.5: in fact the resulting plot of fluctuations as a function
of rmin resembles a λ-transition in statistical mechanics
10. Hence rmin = 0.5 seems
to represent a ‘critical’ value, thereby adding weight to the conjecture that real
markets may be positioned at some kind of critical point.
Figures 5 and 6 show the resulting “price” and “volume” series for trader pop-
ulations with long and short memories respectively. In the simulations we take
T = 500, however the results are similar for larger T . For a population of the
long-memory traders (Fig. 5), the volume is non-zero and large jumps in the price
do not occur at a single time-step. Although similar general patterns can be found
in the time-series for a population of short-memory traders (Fig. 6) the volume is
often zero (the market becomes illiquid) and exhibits large spikes - corresponding
large jumps in the price also arise (Fig. 6). Although this study is at a prelim-
inary stage, we note in passing that large jumps in real stock prices can indeed
be accompanied by large jumps in trading volume: see, for example, the behavior
of Vodafone stock11 in November 1995, and Hanson stock11 at the end of January
1996.
7Fig. 5. A section of the “price” and “volume” time-series generated by minority game with
confidence threshold rmin = 0.51 and long trader memory (m = 6). N = 1001 and s = 2.
Fig. 6. A section of the “price” and “volume” time-series generated by minority game with
confidence threshold rmin = 0.51 and short trader memory (m = 2). N = 1001 and s = 2.
8 Presented at Dublin Finance Conference (1999)
5. Conclusion
In summary, we have discussed two generalizations of the basic Minority Game.
When the trader population is characterized by two different memories (‘time hori-
zons’) the average winnings per trader can exceed that of a pure population. When
traders can opt not to trade based on their confidence level, we find that large fluc-
tuations can arise in the ‘volume’ of market participants and the resulting market
‘price’.
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